Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 is endemic in Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and eastern India (FAO, 2011; FAO, 2013) . Because recent reports have indicated that the virus is now causing multiple outbreaks in Nigeria (OIE, 2015) , endemicity may soon include more countries.
Unless humans are exposed to or consume infected poultry, H5N1 is not viewed as zoonosis (Fournié et al., 2013; Patel et al., 2014; Van Kerkhove et al., 2011) . However, zoonotic dissemination may occur if bird-mediated (viral-human) contacts promote the full adaptation of the virus to humans (Van Kerkhove et al., 2011) .
Unfortunately, this avian virus has already adapted to mammals: ferrets can be infected (Herfst et al., 2012; Imai et al., 2012) , and seropositive guinea pigs and cats have been found (Zhou et al., 2015; Li et al; . In addition, reassortant viruses bind to a human-type receptor (Li et al., 2015) . Such facts are highly disturbing: a few additional mutations would suffice for the avian H5N1 virus to become fully adapted to humans -an event that could result in a pandemic (Morens et al., 2012) .
Measuring the complexity of disease-related interactions may uncover avianmammalian contacts. To that end, surveillance systems should be designed to be not only biologically specific (adjusted to capture the biology of a specific pathogen) but also tailored to measure associated (geographical, social, commercial) conditions that may prevent (or promote) disease dissemination. If valid, such a surveillance model could both determine the actual prevalence of morbidity and mortality and evaluate the efficacy of measures meant to disrupt viral-human contacts -a critical piece in efforts aimed at preventing zoonoses.
To develop a H5N1-specific surveillance model adjusted both to African conditions, two elements may be considered: (i) poultry is a major food item in Africa, and (ii) H5N1-infected poultry may reach humans (de Jong et al., 2005; Fasina et al., 2009; Kandeel et al., 2010; . Hence, instances associated with exposure to or consumption of H5N1-infected poultry, may be investigated such as: (i) food markets, (ii) food transportation, (iii) commercial practices, (iv) culture (food-cooking related behaviours), and (v) demographics (subgroups with higher mortality risks, e.g., young pregnant women) (Areechokchai et al., 2006; Greiner et al., 2007; Fasina et al., 2010; Van Kerkhove et al., 2011) .
The rationale of such model is that, if a more complex construct was built (such that more interactions were captured and they were functionally related), such model could better monitor avian-human contacts, detecting both desirable and undesirable inputs and/or outcomes. For instance, it could identify why and/or how, over time, improvements (or undesirable changes) occurred at specific geographical sites, points, facilitating replications of successful experiences (or prompt and targeted remedies).
To build a model that accounts for both predictors and outcomes, two sets of factors could be considered: (i) 'early' or preceding behaviours (those that occur before health outcomes are observable), and (ii) 'late' health events or outcomes. One example of 'early' behaviours could be those that refer to food production/transportation/processing. One set of 'late' factors are laboratory-based information on viral survival and infectiousness in poultry.
Such research-based 'late' data can be used to predict human mortality.
Other early behaviours could include: (i) household poultry producers; (ii) village slaughter sites; (iii) live bird markets, (iv) the presence or absence of open contacts (noncompartmentalized communications, such as those that both transport eggs, and also carry chickens ready for the market); (v) the number and professional quality of food inspectors, and (vi) economic conditions that prevent (or promote) hygiene and/or epidemic control (e.g., incentives to sell or not to sell H5N1-contaminated chickens). Together, these indicators could inform on: (i) hygiene, and (ii) the presence (or absence) of procedures that prevent contaminations among the various sub-sectors of the poultry-related food system. Late (health-related) outcomes could be viewed as interactions that lead to human mortality risks. Such interactions may be mediated by: (i) concentration and prevalence of HPAI H5N1 virus in poultry meat, (ii) concentration and prevalence of the virus in poultry faeces and/or the intestinal content (purge) of slaughtered chickens, (iii) the proportion of virus transferred to meat through contamination, (iv) the average volume of a cut piece of meat, (v) the average number of pieces in a food package, (vii) the final concentration of HPAI H5N1 virus in freshly cut poultry, (viii) the presence of virus in undercooked chickens, and (ix) the average volume of poultry eaten by an adult or a child.
To assess external validity, two countries that differed markedly in geographical, ethnic, and linguistic attributes were evaluated. Such model was investigated in Egypt and Nigeria, between 2008 and 2010, in 378 sites or interviews that included: (i) 174 live bird markets, (ii) 191 household poultry producers, (iii) 5 local/village butchers (where ≤ 100 birds were slaughtered every day); (iv) one commercial abattoir (where up to 30,000 birds were slaughtered every day); and (v) seven professional (veterinary) authorities.
Geographically, the study included 15 districts in 3 Egyptian governorates, and 174 Nigerian markets (Anon, 2008; Pagani et al., 2008; Fasina et al., 2011) . Through a combination of documents recorded as pictures and interviews (qualitative data), which were then summarized in quantitative terms adjusted to geographical/behavioural/economic dimensions, the basic question asked was: does a disease surveillance model that includes two or more predictors result in the same or different mortality risk than simpler ones?
Materials and Methods

2.1
The sites
Egyptian sites -Field evaluation: Fifteen Districts located in 3 Egyptian governorates were visited between June and November 2010. A total of (i) 191 household poultry producers,
(ii) 5 local/village butchers (where ≤ 100 birds were slaughtered every day); (iv) one commercial abattoir (where up to 30,000 birds were slaughtered every day); and (v) seven professional (veterinary) authorities were visited for observations, surveys or interviews.
Photographic documentations were done to serve as checklist for qualitative and quantitative data. These were backed by other documents Edmunds et al., 2013) .
Nigerian sites -live bird markets (LBM): Document analysis on 174 Nigerian live bird markets (LBM) were based on previous works (Pagani et al., 2008; Anon, 2008 Risk assessment: The determination of the probability that an adverse effect of influenza A (H5N1) (morbidity or mortality) will result from a defined exposure through naso-oral route.
Exposure assessment: Inadvertent exposure is likely through visiting the live bird markets, during slaughtering, scalding, de-feathering, processing, the cutting and cooking process and/or through the consumption of partially cooked meat. Infection occurs through inhalation of aerosolized virus particles, contact with human mucosa and wound surfaces, and certain behaviours that facilitate oral uptakes including licking of fingers, accidental splashing of juices from raw contaminated product, tasting of partially cooked meat and cross-contamination of foods not likely to be cooked which could result in deposition of the virus in the oral cavity (Bauer et al., 2010) . Dose-response model: This refers to the magnitude of exposure and the degree/frequency of responses or adverse effects. We utilized the multistage model for the study based on biological premises that consider epidemiological data with increasing potential as time progresses (Altshuler, 1981) .
Risk characterization: The estimated adverse health effects predicted to occur in the population in response to foodborne infection with influenza A (H5N1) and a summary of assumptions and sources of uncertainties (Altshuler, 1981; Bauer et al., 2010) .
Because disease dissemination is proportional to the number of contacts with contaminated food and the average viral concentration of each exposure, exposure-related factors should also be considered in risk assessments. An exposure to a pathogenic agent usually occurs in a dose-response relationship. Such relationship describes the likelihood and severity of adverse health consequences (the responses) in relation to the amount of the pathogens. In this case, an exposure to a low level of influenza A (H5N1) virus may present with serological response but will not lead to clinical outcomes. However, with a higher dose, the same virus may lead to clinical outcomes and possibly death (Box A).
Risks were assessed with two models. One focused on food. The second focused on one demographic subset (pregnant women).
Food-related risks -Parameters and assumptions
Based on the literature, input variables were functionally related and characterized as shown in Figure 1 and Table 1: 1. The concentration of Influenza A (H5N1) in meat is within the low to high infective dose (Log10 EID 50 (10^7.8 -10^8.5) and, in faeces, 10^8.7 Swayne and Beck, 2005; Thomas and Swayne, 2007) .
2. At least 90 % of the contaminated meat will contain infectious virus (Das et al, 2008; Swayne and Beck, 2005; Van Reeth, 2007) .
3. In the absence of biosecurity, contamination will be carried out across all steps -from delivery of live birds, to delivery to homes for cooking.
4. Each processed chicken weighs between 1.13 and 1.7kg and will be cut into 8 -14
pieces ( The probability distributions included the following input parameters: Cassin et al., 1998 .  Extra exposure for women during cooking process.
NB: Pathway adapted from
Processes from live bird markets to transportation to the household

Mass consumed (age dependent) and stress.
Prevalence in fresh poultry
Concentration in fresh poultry
Dose response  Host susceptibility, probability of infection & illnesses due to influenza A (H5N1), conditional probability of severe outcome (mortality)  Probability of recovery is (1-P mort ) -(1-P ill )
Probability of exposure
Ingested dose in meat Probability of mortality Probability of illness  Normal distribution (inputs described by the mean and standard deviation).
Probability of recovery
Pregnant women-related risks -Parameters and assumptions
In the second model, pregnant women were considered because, associated with their pregnancy-related impaired immunity and home cooking habits, they may possess higher risks of infection (WHO, 2007; Creanga et al., 2009) . We assumed that between 1 and 25% of the pregnant women were infected and only half of them (between 0.5 and 12.5% of the 
Results
While the two investigated countries differed geographically, socially, and linguistically, they revealed similar information (Figure 2 ). (vii) incentives to spread diseases (selling infected chickens was tacitly promoted).
Field evaluations revealed several anomalies (Figure 2 ). The composite mean biosecurity score was dismally low (25.00 -25.74%, Table 2 ). Thus, poultry products seemed to possess high risks of contamination. Such inference was further supported by poor or non-existent veterinary services at LBMs (Table 2) . Consequently, sick birds were likely to contaminate processed carcasses, and get access to the food chain outlined in the risk model.
Combining both input parameters and recent population data (which included 11
African countries where avian influenza H5N1 has infected poultry), a total of 15,159 human infections (min = 4,758; max = 66,087) were estimated (Table 3) . Of those, up to 1,964 may have died (min = 15; max= 12,688; Table 3 ). Such analyses did not include pregnant women.
When pregnant women were investigated (and a 25% infection rate was assumed), a total of 84,308 infections were estimated (min = 39,198; max = 176,594, Table 3 ) and up to 10,342 may have died. Instead, if a 1% infection rate was assumed, 3,372 women may have become infected with influenza A (H5N1) and approximately 414 may have died (Table 3 ).
Figure 2. A non-compartmentalized system that promotes disease dispersal
The same transportation system is used both to distribute eggs to small (backyard) producers and to pick up chickens ready to be processed and distributed to small (village) markets. No separation exists between the delivery of one-day old eggs (which are exposed to the environment) and the collection of chickens. Birds of different sources are kept together in slaughtering facilities and lacked water. No health inspection is performed at any one activity and no separation exist between the different compartments of the slaughter and processing sub-systems. Therefore, any infected animal has abundant opportunities to contaminate any other element of the system. Pictures like these were observed in both investigated countries. Data were compiled from the work of Pagani et al., 2008 and Anon, 2008 . The qualitative scores were translated into very good = 4; good = 3, good to poor = 2, poor = 1 and very poor = 0 and used to calculate the composite mean biosecurity score in percentages.
*Note that: Several items in the variable carried the value "0" were part of the analysis but excluded in the table here. Other items were also excluded in this Values in boldfonts are the mean number of individuals that were potentially infected, died or recovered. Probability of recovery = [(1-P mort ) -(1-P ill )], where 1-P ill = Population not infected and 1-P mort = Population not infected + population infected without fatal outcome. Recovered persons may show sign of illness or may not have displayed classical respiratory signs of influenza virus infection (de Jong et al., 2005) . The values in parenthesis behind the means are minimum and maximum values obtained at 90% confidence interval (CI 90% ). Note that the data used for pregnant women also considered women that seek hospitalization due to illness during pregnancy (Creanga et al., 2010; Thompson et al., 2010) . 
Probability of mortality in pregnant women
The majority of the infected persons likely originated from Nigeria (n = 5,484, CI 90% = 1,686; 24,861), Egypt (n = 4,033, CI 90% = 1,370; 16,129), and Sudan (n = 1,446, CI 90% = 431; 6,419; Table 3 ). Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso were also likely to have numerous infected individuals (Table 3) . On average, each of the African countries considered may have had between 0.0033 and 0.005% of their population infected, and up to 0.0006% of the population may have died (Table 3) . Pregnant women and persons ≥ 64 years of age had high infection and death risks (81-82% and 10-11% of the total infected persons, respectively, Table 3 ). In contrast, children (≤ 19 years) accounted for only 2.3% of all infected persons and 2.5% of all deaths. Factors associated with mortality were: (i) virus presence in undercooked meat, (ii) ingested virus dose, and (iii) the volume (weight) of poultry consumed (Table 1) .
Discussion
Risk assessment-related findings were based on assumptions that may influence the validity of this proof-of-concept. For example, when data on H5N1 were unavailable (due to scarcity of validated empirical data), parameters from other influenza A subtypes were utilized. Seasonal variations, which may be substantial (Robinson et al., 2013) , were not considered. Such limitations do not modify the major message of this study: surveillance systems are critical to promote both health and safe nutrition, and to prevent zoonoses that may become pandemic. To build effective surveillance systems appropriate for viral influenza, the adaptation of the pathogen to other species should be considered. Viral adaptations to new host species are known to depend on the frequency of interspecies contacts: the more contacts, the higher the chances of a full adaptation of avian influenza virus to humans. Should that occur, a pandemic cannot be ruled out.
The post-World War I pandemic provides an example of what a full adaptation of an avian virus to human hosts may generate: the virus disseminated by soldiers returning from the war killed up to ten times more people than humans deaths directly attributed to the war (Beran, 2008) . Such example gives a reference on the magnitude of the problem today faced not only by African populations but also by the whole human species.
Such risk depends on how disease surveillance is conceptualized and then implemented. The available evidence suggests that many, if not most countries, are not well prepared for the challenge. Too many agencies, usually built along professional traditions, still lack centralized decision-making. Human health agencies tend to lack veterinary epidemiological expertise and animal health agencies may not possess human epidemiological expertise (Rabinowitz et al., 2012; Nichols et al., 2014) .
Food biosecurity is a component of disease surveillance. To prevent a H5N1-mediated pandemic, the way poultry is produced, processed, transported, and commercialized is the first line of defense. Yet, biosecurity is not enough: public education campaigns aimed at promoting behavioural change are also needed. Countries affected by H5N1, such as Vietnam, have shown successful models on behavioural change (MARD and MoH, 2011) .
Such campaigns may consider food preparation methods (cooking, roasting, flame-grilling, barbequing, frying), which can reduce the risk of foodborne infection (Kayali et al., 2014) .
Such campaigns may also focus on local or age-related aspects that influence risks.
For instance. teenagers, as well as pregnant women (and, consequently, young pregnant women) are suspected to be at high risk of infection and associated death (Jo-Trepka et al., 2007; WHO, 2007; Creanga et al., 2010; Oner et al., 2012) .
Thus, interdisciplinary, research-based, surveillance systems are needed. While, potentially, the number of topics and disciplines may lead to an exorbitantly large number of combinations, a disease surveillance model that covers at least some inputs or early behaviours, and some health-related outcomes, such as this, is both broad enough to capture more information than classic models -which focus on clinical cases, a limited subset-and simple enough to be practiced at a low cost, and rapidly. 
Trading
• Prevalence and concentration of Influenza A H5N1 in the LBM with direct or inadvertent human mucosal and wound contacts are determined by the sources of birds, level of aerosolised virus, faecal contamination, unkempt wound & unsanitary behaviours. These are influenced by temperature, humidity, virus strain, pH, dehydration, salinity and other microorganisms (Bauer et al, 2010; Scholtissek et al., 1985; Stallnecht et al., 1990; Shortridge et al., 1998; Lu et al., 2003b; Swayne and Halvorson, 2003; John and Rose, 2005; Fasina et., 2007) .
Slaughtering
• Prevalence of concentration of Influenza A H5N1 posing risk to human during the slaughter process are influenced by the level of infection carried forward from the infected bird from trading, faecal contaminations, sources of birds, unsanitary behaviour, wound contaminations, behaviours supporting oral uptake like licking/eating during slaughter, season of slaughter, and contaminations from utensils, wipers and equipment (Luber et al., 2006; Bauer et al., 2010; Da Silva, 2014a , 2014b .
Scalding
• Prevalence of concentration of Influenza A H5N1 posing risk to human during the scalding process are influenced by the level of infection carried forward from the slaughtered infected /contaminated bird, temprature of water for scalding, unsanitary behaviour, contaminations from utensils, water quality, wipers and equipment (Arnold, 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; Nicholson, Groves and Chambers, 2005; Bauer et al., 2010; Da Silva, 2014b) . Scalding temperature range between 50-58 O C and maximum of ≤65 O C for 4 minutes (insufficient to kill the virus). Underscalded carcasses are difficult to pluck and overscalded ones are cooked with torn flesh (Da Silva, 2014b.
Defeathering
• Prevalence of concentration of Influenza A H5N1 posing risk to human during the defeathering process are influenced by the level of infection carried forward from scalding of infected/contaminated bird. Unsanitary behaviour, contaminations from utensils, season, water quality aiding contamination, rinsing and wiping, and equipment will aid perpetuation of infection (Arnold, 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; Nicholson, Groves and Chambers, 2005; Bauer et al., 2010; Da Silva, 2014b) . Humans may also get infected from infected contaminated feathers, aerosolised materials, and improperly discarded or accidentally discharged gut contents.
Evisceration
• Prevalence of concentration of Influenza A H5N1 posing risk to human during evisceration are influenced by the level of infection carried forward from defeathering. It is perhaps the most important sources of risk to processors of infected bird. Discharged gut content contains a high level of infectious virus and may contaminate carcass, tables and utensils directly. Unsanitary behaviour, contaminated utensils, wiping cloths, water quality, and equipment will aid perpetuation of infection (Cassin et al., 1998; Arnold, 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; Nicholson, Groves and Chambers, 2005; Bauer et al., 2010; Da Silva, 2014b) .
Processing
• Prevalence of concentration of Influenza A H5N1 posing risk to human during further processing are influenced by the log concentration of virus shed above and the level of contamination. Washing of meat before and after evisceration, utensils, washing of tables, poor water quality, wiping cloths can all contribute to contamination. Surface areas of the carcasses are also opened up while cutting possibly with contaminated equipment and tools thereby aiding contaminants. Virus can continue to survive in the tissues up for 5-6 days post-slaughter. (Luber et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007; Nicholson, Groves and Chambers, 2005; Busquets et al., 2010; Bauer et al., 2010; Da Silva, 2014b; Indriani et al., 2010; Cogan, Bloomfield and Humphrey, 1999) .
Packaging
/Retailing
• Prevalence of concentration of Influenza A H5N1 posing risk to human during packaging/retailing are influenced by the log concentration of virus retained from the process above The final contribution will be dependent on the downstream and immediate transport for consumption, refrigeration (where feasible), and exposure of the packs to sulnight, pH, chemicals etc. (Logue and Nde, 2007; Bauer et al., 2010; Da Silva, 2014b; Indriani et al., 2010; Cogan, Bloomfield and Humphrey, 1999) .
Transport
• Prevalence of concentration of Influenza A H5N1 posing risk to human during transportation is not significantly since it is expected to be done within a short time. It should be noted that many consumers in Africa prefer a freshly slaughtered and prepared carcass. Sociocultural observation shows that women will usually buy the birds for slaughter, pack it and travel home at the end of wirking day with about 30 minutes to 2 hours of travel time. Input is a factor of travel time to reach home. Most packages are transported piecemeal to meet the need of a family. At home, there is high likelihood that the meat is processed immediatelyfor consumption. (Ali et al., 2013a (Ali et al., , 2013b Bauer et al., 2010; Indriani et al., 2010; ) .
Refrigeration
• Socio-culturally, refrigeration is hardly practised in Africa particularly for smallcarcass originating from chicken or other smaller birds. Most consumers will prefer a freshly cut pieces and will proceed to cooking directly once the carcass reach the kitchen. In few cases, the more affluent individuals may have refrigerators and store a month supply of meat. However, where electricity is a challenge, and this further discourage the storage of meat for a relatively long time (Ali et al., 2013a (Ali et al., , 2013b 
Cooking
• Prevalence and concentration of infectious Influenza A H5N1 in the cooked meat is dependent on the cooking preference, cooking time, final core temperature of ≥65 O C , and the thermal inactivation regression parameters (FAO/WHO2002 doc, Ecosure, 2008 , Cassin et al 1998 . Traditional cooking method will inadvertently kill the virus but where meat is mildly roasted, marinated and prepared using fast-food preparation processes that does not consider relatively long cooking time, the risk of passing on of infectious agent (Influenza A H5N1 virus) is real.
Consumption
• Consumption present with minimal risk of infection save for the house wives that may taste meat during the cooking process to assess the degree of cooking. However, stressful conditions such as pregnancy, malnutrition, poverty, war situation, natural disaster are major issue that may drive an increase in food borne infection such as influenza A H5N1. Persons exposed to coagulated blood, blood puddings, chicken-and-duck blood soup and such food are also at higher risks (Chotpitayasunondh et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2005; Hayden and Croisier, 2005; Da Silva, 2014b) .
